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ABSTRACT  
 
BOGARDUS, JUSTIN     Economic and Political Implications of Agricultural Subsidies 
and Farm Policy, June 2014. 
 
ADVISORS: Bradley Lewis (Economics) and Clifford Brown (Political Science) 
  
This thesis pertains to agricultural subsidies, their economic and political 
implications and what would happen to both price and production levels of different 
crops should those subsidies be removed. The 3 main crops examined are corn, wool and 
soybeans. Technological advancements made after 1900 had a profound effect on 
productivity and efficiency, leading to a number of important economic effects. Market 
integration, economies of scale, market structure, vertical integration and subsidization, 
all led to government intervention in the form of regulation and subsidy.  
Farm policy, starting in early 1900s, focused on price stabilization policies and 
food programs through the different federal acts and agencies created over this time 
period, starting with the USDA and New Deal in the early 1900s to the post WWII farm 
bills, culminating with the recent farm bills in Congress now. The empirical analysis is 
based on data obtained through the USDA regarding production, import, export, price 
and subsidy data. The analytic focus of the econometric model is on the potential effects 
of eliminating subsidies, hypothesizing that production would be lower, prices higher and 
the level of disparity between farm and non-farm incomes, higher. I found the conclusion 
mixed, with the hypothesis being supported for some, but not all cases.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
   3
Table of Contents 
 
 
Chapter 1 Mechanical and Scientific Advancements and Their Effects               page 1 
 
Chapter 2 Economic Theory and Political History                 page 17 
 
Chapter 3 Data Set and Regression Analyses                 page 34 
 
Chapter 4 Pros and Cons of Price Supports page                page 52 
 
Chapter 5 Where we are today, and where we’re going               page 65 
 
Chapter 6 Conclusions                  page 73 
 
Appendix                      page 78 
 
Bibliography                     page 84 
 
 
  
   4
Chapter 1 
Mechanical and Scientific Advancements and Their Effects 
  
Beginning in the early 1900s, there have been several technological advancements 
that have impacted the farming process, both for producers and for consumers.  There are 
four distinct areas of advancement that instituted dynamic change in not only costs but 
also efficiency and output levels.  These three areas include technological advancements, 
biotechnological advancements and expansion of information and marketing.  Between 
them, the result was the mechanization and industrialization of the farming industry, with 
effects including an increase in farm size, an increase in output, a decrease in price and a 
decrease in labor.  There are both positive and negative externalities related to these 
effects that shaped the agricultural sector into what it is today. 
Technological Advancements 
 There have been a multitude of technological advancements since the turn of the 
century that have had a great impact on efficiency and cost.  Arguably the most important 
of them was the change from horsepower to the gasoline tractor.  This change not only 
influenced the amount produced, but also which crops were grown to begin with.  In 
addition to the switch to the tractor, the electrification of rural areas and the development 
of interstate travel were two more major advancements that expanded on these increases.   
 Horsepower was the backbone of farm power since the beginning of American 
agriculture.  By 1915 it had reached its peak with over 21 million horses in use. (Gardner, 
pp. 10-11) At the same time however, the gasoline tractor was being developed and 
improved.  By the 1930s the tractor had reached a new level of versatility, reliability and 
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affordability and began to replace the traditional form of power.
2
  The economic result 
was a dramatic increase in output per hour.
3
  
 Pertaining to the production aspect of farming, the usage of horses contained a 
major drawback, namely that the horses needed to be fed.  The main food source for 
horses was oats, meaning that farmers needed to set aside a certain amount of their 
farmable land to grow the feed.  The economic implications are essentially that the area 
set aside is a deadweight loss, meaning that it is lost revenue.  With the switch to the 
tractor, there was no more need to grow the oats for feed, leading to a major shift in 
which crops were grown in the United States.  The initial figures indicate that over 93 
million acres were used to grow oats, and by the 1960s this dropped to only 4 million 
acres.
4
  By switching to the gasoline tractor, farmers had essentially freed up over 25% of 
America’s farmable land area.   
 In addition to the adoption of the tractor, there have been a myriad of other 
technological innovations in the period between 1900 and 1940.  These include the 
introduction of completely new types of machinery as well as durability improvements of 
existing inputs.  Table 2.1 below lists some of the notable technical innovations during 
the time period.
5
  The effects of these amazing changes were a sharp increase in output 
given the current inputs and both qualitative and quantitative changes in both crops and 
livestock.  
 
                                                 
2
 Ibid. 
3
 American Agriculture pages 14-15 
4
 American Agriculture page 12 
5
 American Agriculture page 9 
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 The second major area of dynamic change was the electrification of rural areas, 
which led to not only the advancement of rural areas with respect to urban areas but also 
to a new level of mechanization of smaller farms.  The major electrification effort began 
with the New Deal under President Roosevelt.  Under it, the Rural Electrification 
Administration was established in 1935 and tasked with wiring rural areas, notably major 
farm areas, with electricity.  In 1982 a report was submitted to the House Appropriations 
Committee regarding the accomplishments of the REA program.  The resulting report 
highlighted the success of the program, with the graph below showing that “By 1953 
more than 90 percent of all farms in the U.S. had electricity; for telephone service, the 90 
percent mark was passed in 1976”.  With this electrification, communication in the form 
of telephone lines also increased, generating a much greater flow of information in and 
out of rural areas.   
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 The third and final major area of technological advancement came later on in the 
1950s with the development of the Interstate highway system.  Prior to the inception of 
the highway system, train delivery was the standard.  The process was expensive, slow 
and given the time sensitive nature of crops almost wholly unfeasible, in effect leaving 
farming much more localized.  However, after President Eisenhower signed the Interstate 
Highways Act into law in 1956, cross-country travel was much easier, linking the 
different regions within the country.  As Andrew Armbruster wrote in his paper The 
Interstate Highway System, “Movement of freight via trucks using the interstate highway 
system is markedly less expensive than movement by rail.” (Armbruster, 2005) The 
graph below shows that highway freight costs are ¼ as much as railway costs, which 
holds true for the agricultural sector as well. 
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 The effects of these technological advancements can be described as the 
“mechanization of the farm”.  With the introduction of new machinery, much of the more 
painstaking labor was alleviated, and both the cost and amount of labor provided went 
down during the 1930-1960 period.  Figure 2.3a shows the amount of labor hours needed 
for several major crops over the 1900-1990 period, and it confirms the downward trend.
8
 
                                                 
8
 American Agriculture page 16 
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Following WWII, which in itself drew a lot of labor away from the farming sector, labor 
was pushed out further with more technological substitutes.  In terms of production, the 
adoption of the tractor over the horse led to major efficiency and output level related 
gains, and also changed land allocation protocols.
9
 Later on with biotechnological 
changes, these gains would see further increases.  Finally, with the electrification of rural 
America, the development of new machinery and their subsequent availability in rural 
areas led to the steep divide between rural and urban areas mellowing. 
                                                 
9
 American Agriculture pages 18-19 
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Chemical and Biotechnological Advancements 
 The second major area of farming advancement was in the biotech field.  The 
advent of pesticides, fertilizers and genetic engineering rivals the importance of the 
tractor in the evolution of American agriculture.  Later on the in the 1960s biotech would 
make another great leap forward with the introduction of animal antibiotics and 
hormones.  Through these character improvements output and land availability grew even 
further. 
 The first improvements came in the form of pesticides and fertilization.  During 
the post WWII period, commercial fertilization took off, particularly the use of nitrogen 
based fertilizer.
10
  Figures 2.6a and 2.6b show the growth trend in the use of fertilizer 
over time, with a major uptick starting in 1940, right around the end of WWII.
11
 
                                                 
10
 American Agriculture pages 22-26 
11
 American Agriculture page 23 
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Nitrogen is extremely important to the growth of plants and coupled with seed 
advancements that allowed for the uptake of more nutrients, the growth rate of crops 
increased.   
   12
The second major group of chemicals used in farming is pesticides.  Figure 2.7 
shows a similar trend to that of fertilizers, with usage following WWII massively 
increasing.
12
   
 
The economic gains from pesticides are very real, around $3 to $5 dollars for every $1 of 
pesticides used.
13
  Not every outcome is positive however, and pesticide use has garnered 
heavy media attention surrounding the pesticide chemicals and their potential harm to 
both the environment and to the population who consume the crops.  Over time the more 
                                                 
12
 American Agriculture page 24 
13
 Ibid. 
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harmful chemicals such as DDT and others that have long-term environmental effects 
have been phased out.
14
 
 Genetic engineering of crops for pest control and desirable traits has been one of 
the most significant achievements for not only the farming sector in the United States but 
also the world.  While selective breeding has been around for hundreds if not thousands 
of years, the scientific achievement of targeted genetic engineering has made it possible 
to grow stronger, more resilient crops.  And while there are arguments against genetically 
modified organisms (GMOs), the overall consensus is one of major success.   
The advent of GMOs has been a boon for both supply and output of major crops.  
The breeding of traits for resiliency to pests and varying weather conditions have allowed 
for much less crop loss to weeds, destructive insects and extreme weather.
15
  Another 
great economic and environmental benefit is that the cost of genetically modified seeds is 
“…more than offset by the savings from the reduction in the use of pesticides”.16  
According to the American Institute of Biological Sciences paper Benefits and Risks of 
Genetic Engineering in Agriculture, “Engineering crop resistance to insect and plant 
pathogen pests offers opportunities to reduce the use of insecticides and fungicides in 
crop production. This approach can be expected to reduce problems from pesticides and 
improve the economics of pest control.”17  The result is that over half of soybean acreage 
and one fourth of corn acreage contained genetically modified seeds by the year 2000.   
The final major advancement in farming due to biotech and other scientific 
advancements is the introduction of antibiotics and hormones to livestock.  Antibiotics 
                                                 
14
 American Agriculture page 25 
15
 American Agriculture page 26 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 D. Pimentel, 1989 
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have been routinely given to cattle and other animals since 1960, but it really took off in 
the 1980s when scientists could mass-produce synthetic hormones and specifically 
engineer antibiotics.
18
  These hormones allow for animals to grow at a much faster rate 
and to also grow to a much bigger size.   
The pushback against GMOs and animal hormones has been focused primarily on 
scientific ambiguity.  One example is the argument that there is no way to be sure of the 
long-term health effects of GMOs or the hormones in animals.  This argument has been 
mostly discarded; as we are now well into the future since the adoption of modified seeds 
and the introduction of hormones.  The major argument against is now focused primarily 
on biodiversity and more importantly the lack thereof.  The Biological Sciences paper 
states, “The Traditional plant breeding techniques have dramatically reduced genetic 
diversity in most crops.  Unfortunately, this genetic uniformity has increased crop 
vulnerability to insect pests, diseases, and climatic fluctuations (NAS 1972)”.19 
Previously, crop fields contained many different species of the same crop in the 
effort to diversify in case of pests or weather anomalies.  With selective breeding 
essentially discontinuing many species of seeds in favor of a handful that are genetically 
superior, the threat then is whether or not a “superbug” can effectively kill off the entire 
crop.  This question is also poised with respect to antibiotics in livestock and whether or 
not we are breeding an antibiotic resistant superbug that will be detrimental to humans.  
These questions must be addressed moving forward in order to ensure the safety of both 
the food supply and of consumers.   
                                                 
18
 American Agriculture page 26 
19
 D. Pimentel et all Benefits and Risks of Genetic Engineering in Agriculture 
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The effects of the biotech and other scientific advancements are very similar to 
the technological ones.  With better, faster growing livestock and crops, costs decrease 
and the supply of these products increase, which at the same time lowers prices.  Genetic 
advantages also allow for increased land usage into areas that before might have been 
impossible.  In the benefits section of their genetic engineering paper, Pimental and the 
other authors argue the same points in saying, “Genetic engineering could significantly 
improve yields and enhance the efficiency of crop and livestock production in the coming 
decades (NAS 1987b). These goals can be accomplished by increasing the proportion of a 
crop that can be harvested and by enhancing a crop's tolerance to various stresses”.20   
On the more critical side, the introduction of genetic engineering begs the 
question of product rights and ethics.  The US is currently seeing this with Monsanto and 
the question of whether or not one can “patent life”.  Pimental and his co-authors address 
these issue of ethics and economic incentives, “The financial rewards for successful 
research in genetic engineering are enormous. However, these incentives are unlikely to 
encourage innovation aimed at providing the greatest humanitarian good (Buttel et al. 
1985)”.21  Their conclusion given these ethical concerns is to have a clearly defined 
government role in regulating the process while at the same time promoting research. 
Information and Marketing 
 The improvement of communications technology during the 20
th
 century had a 
profound effect on the dissemination of information in real time, something more than 
advantageous for farmers.  Through the radio, telephone, television, and later on through 
                                                 
20
 Ibid. 
21
 Ibid. 
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the Internet, farmers had access to new information that ultimately led to better crop 
yields and to better marketing and selling of their products. 
 Through the electrification of rural areas, farmers gained access to means of 
communication that dwarfed their current system.  The radio and television were the first 
of these advancements, and brought not only economic but also social and cultural 
improvement as well.
22
  With the introduction of the radio and television to rural 
communities and to farmers, real time information of weather and markets gave a huge 
leg up to rural farmers.  In the cultural and social aspect, the radio also brought 
educational programming and entertainment, which helped to close even further the gap 
between urban and rural populations.
23
  The second major advancement during the first 
half of the 20
th
 century was the telephone.  In addition to the advantages gained above in 
real time transfer of information, the telephone went further in that it also allowed for 
farmers to conduct business transactions at an unprecedented speed.
24
     
 The last major communications improvement came much later around the 1980s 
with the invention of the Internet.  With the Internet and related technologies information 
gathering went from fast to instantaneous, and meteorological science became 
significantly more accurate, giving farmers much more reliable a picture of what was 
going to happen.  Combined with GPS satellites, planting and harvesting became much 
more accurate and to a point automated as tractors with GPS systems could essentially 
plow the fields without the need for a driver.  With respect to marketing, the Internet gave 
                                                 
22
 American Agriculture page 27 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid. 
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farmers and other businesses a much bigger customer base, as well as a much more 
precise measure of different markets not only locally but also nationwide.   
 There were significant gains made through the use and spread of communications 
technology into rural America.  From 1925 to 1954 radio use increased from 4% to 
almost universal use, and television use was at almost 35%.  With an addendum to the 
Rural Electrification Act in 1949 to include a subsidization program for telephone 
installation, telephone ownership rose to 76% by 1964.
 25
 
Overall Effects 
 Looking at the different technological and scientific advancements together, an 
overall picture of progress can be seen between the turn of the 20
th
 century until the 
present.  The economic impacts can be seen in three major areas: production, costs and 
price.  All three show positive change, with production levels up and costs and prices 
down.  On a related note, farm labor has also been affected, and there are both pros and 
cons to the resulting figures. 
 The large majority of advancements have been focused on the supply side of the 
farming equation.  Scientific achievements have allowed for great growth in land 
productivity, namely the total amount of land available and how much can be extracted 
from it.  Coupled with efficiency increases in related technologies including the tractor 
and processing equipment, the amount of crops harvested and the speed in which they are 
processed has increased steadily, leading to a tremendous increase in supply.  
Additionally, scientific advancements allowed for a much stronger crop, leading to an 
expansion in land area used, further boosting production levels.   
                                                 
25
 Ibid. 
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 With these advancements came not only production increases, but also cost 
decreases.  With the genetic engineering of crops, more generic growth aids such as 
fertilizer and pesticides became less and less necessary.  The outdating of these 
chemicals, as well as the efficiency gains in the production process led to major decreases 
in production costs.  The end result was a sharp decline in both food prices and the 
amount of money households had to spend on food.  From the beginning to the end of the 
1900s, food prices went down 35% and the percentage of disposable income spent on 
food also declined 29%.
26
  While a decline in food prices is beneficial to consumers, the 
impact of such a decline much harsher for farmers.  A decrease in price leads to a direct 
decrease in farm income.   
One of the biggest effects of these advancements is the expansion of big farms.  
For big farms, the technological improvements were as much if not more important than 
for small farms.  Tractor tech. and other commercial machinery allowed for the 
minimizing of costs.  Secondly, communications tech. is more beneficial for large 
companies as the cost benefit ratio is better than with small companies, if small 
companies can even afford to advertise.  The gains can be seen as the average acreage per 
farm increased from 55 acres in 1929 to 220 acres in 1997.
27
  This highlights the 
increasing amount of land concentration. Large farms also benefit from economies of 
scale.  What this means is that as farms grow, their cost per unit actually decreases, 
leading to much higher profits.   
A second motivation in the shift to big farming is vertical integration.  Vertical 
integration is the linking of different levels of the supply chain through a common owner.  
                                                 
26
 American Agriculture page 141 
27
 American Agriculture pages 66-67 
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For agriculture, this is seen through company involvement with the production, transport 
and sale of crops and livestock.  Through this integration, the cost of doing business is 
consolidated, benefiting consumers as prices can go down in response to lower input 
costs.  However, this is not always the case as vertically integrated companies often have 
tremendous market power, leading to the monopolization of markets. 
In conclusion there have been several technological advancements that have 
impacted the farming process, both for producers and for consumers.  The technological 
advancements, biotechnological advancements and expansion of information and 
marketing have led to the mechanization and industrialization of the farming industry, 
effectively increasing farm size, increasing output, decreasing price and decreasing labor.  
There are both positive and negative externalities related to these effects that shaped both 
political and economic policy related to the agricultural sector.   
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Chapter 2 
Economic Theory and Political History 
 
There are four major areas of economic theory that affect the agricultural market: 
vertical integration, economies of scale, elasticity of markets and subsidization.  These 
theories affect the agricultural sector in a myriad of ways, some positive and some 
negative.  Through the processes of integration and expansion of scale and combined 
with the elasticity and variability of the market, government subsidization in the form of 
price controls and income supports has been the answer.   
 From the post WWII period onward, legislation has evolved and the way in which 
the government tackles the question of subsidies has also evolved.  From the New Deal in 
the 1930s to the Farm Bills in the 60s and 70s to the FAIR Act and ARPA in the 90s the 
method by which the government has supported the farmer has changed.  Along with it, 
the involvement of interest groups has shifted and consolidated power.  The landscape 
today has shown there to be a tight relationship between government and business, 
leading to precarious positions for those in government who do not wish to jeopardize 
their futures in the private sector.  These economic and political factors have all led up to 
the landscape of the agricultural sector today, and understanding the past evolutions is the 
key to moving forward with solutions. 
Economic Theory 
 The first area of economic theory is vertical integration otherwise known as 
supply chain integration.  In theory, vertical integration is the consolidation of different 
levels in the supply chain by one company.  For example, a company owning both the 
production of a product and the methods of shipping can be said to own two levels within 
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the supply chain.  In the late 1800s, this vertical integration took the form of companies 
owning the major mode of transportation, railroads.  Because of the manipulation of 
prices and abuses by these companies, the first form of anti-trust legislation came in to 
protect the consumers.   
In practice, there are two major forms of this integration in the agricultural sector: 
contract integration and ownership integration.  Contract integration is basically the 
commitment of farmers to sell to one company and ownership integration is similar to the 
theory above, a company owning two or more levels within the system.
28
  The most 
important aspect of vertical integration within the agricultural sector is that there is an 
exemption from existing antitrust law, leading to monopoly abuses including food price 
increases.
29
 
The economic impacts of vertical integration within the agricultural sector are 
similar to many other areas in which there are abuses.  Through the consolidation of the 
supply chain, farms have become bigger and more powerful and it has resulted in more 
control over both crop prices as well as intermediate input prices.  In the area of 
intermediary inputs, much of the mechanical equipment is manufactured through a 
handful of companies, leading to increases in the prices of their machines as well.  These 
costs are passed along to the consumer, who suffers the most. 
The second area of economic theory is what is known as economies of scale.  An 
economy of scale is the theory that as a company gets bigger their costs decrease, giving 
them an advantage within the market.  This directly relates to the incidence of abuses and 
                                                 
28
 Ronald D. Knutson, 1990 pages 243-44 
29
 Ronald D. Knutson, 1990 page 285 
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vertical integration above, as a sector with tremendous economies of scale will have a 
much easier time integrating and growing. 
 There are two main forms of the economics of farm size, technical economics and 
pecuniary economics.  The first implies that the increase in size causes a reduction in the 
average cost of production, coming with it huge market power.  Pecuniary economics 
cites the advantage being that as a company grows their cost of inputs goes down.
30
  
Figure 8.2 below showcases the effects of technical economics, with the short run 
average cost curves (SAC) decreasing as farm size increases, eventually reaching a 
minimum efficient size.  Looking to the long-term effects we see again the cost per unit 
of output decreasing toward the point C3. 
  
While these economies of scale are terrific for producers, considerations need to be taken 
with respect to consumer implications and impacts.  Given the reductions in costs and 
                                                 
30
 Ronald D. Knutson, 1990 pages 177-180 
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increase in technological progress, the consumers seem to benefit in both the short and 
long run through the reduction of prices.  The graph below shows the economic theory 
behind the supply curve shift, indicating that through the marginal and average cost shifts 
downward prices will indeed drop.
31
  However, there is also the implication that the 
producers wont pass these savings along to the consumer in a less than competitive 
market, but rather reap more profits for themselves.  In practice, this seems to be more 
the case in the real world.  
  
Within the agricultural sector there are two main reasons for the scalability of 
farms: technological changes, marketing and market equilibrium.  Technological 
changes, which were covered in chapter one, equal major cost minimization.  Much of 
the machinery used in farming is expensive, and bigger companies have a much easier 
time affording and implementing these tools.  Secondly, marketing costs are also much 
                                                 
31
 Ronald D. Knutson, 1990 Figure 8.4 page 181 
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lighter as the company gets bigger.  The costs for marketing in a certain area are the same 
for both big and small companies, which means that the bigger companies have less real 
cost in comparison.
32
  
The elasticity of demand for crops within the agricultural market plays an 
important role in the determination of whether or not the government should grant 
subsidies and directly intervene in the market.  In economics, elasticity indicates how 
much of one good will be sold when another variable is changed.  This can be on the 
supply side or demand side.  For the supply side the question would be how much more 
will I produce and the demand side would be how much more will be demanded.  Within 
these parameters, price elasticity of demand is almost always negative, meaning as the 
price of the good goes up; the demand for it will go down. 
Within the agricultural sector, this negative price elasticity can be seen.  The 
elasticity of demand for crops according to Gardner in American Agriculture in the 20
th
 
Century is -.2, meaning that for every unit of price increase the demand for the good will 
go down by .2 units.
33
  Within the market itself, the price of these crops is also very 
sensitive.  Given the volatile nature of farming, with weather anomalies and crop failures, 
prices shift dramatically.  These price swings, coupled with the inelastic nature of the 
market leads to demand inconsistencies.   
The picture painted by these three economic effects is not economically or 
politically ideal.  The market is unpredictable, big corporate farms are pushing out the 
small farmers, consumers are being subjected to artificially higher prices and there is no 
private sector insurance for farmers in case of crop disaster.  These negative externalities 
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 Gardner American Agriculture page 73 
33
 Gardner American Agriculture page 141 
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beg for resolution, and the answers dating all the way back to the New Deal era and used 
still today is subsidies.  
History and Evolution of Subsidies and Legislation 
 Subsidization as an economic theory is the support of a sector within the economy 
with the goal of promoting certain outcomes.  In the case of the agricultural sector these 
outcomes are to support and stabilize crop prices and to ensure farmers a basic level of 
income.  In conjunction with these two main goals there are also secondary goals in the 
form of food programs aimed at helping impoverished citizens.  Over the course of the 
20
th
 century there have been a myriad of ways to go about solving these two dilemmas, 
but many have been phased out or evolved into the main forms we see today. 
 The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 signaled the first step in the 
government’s involvement within the agricultural sector, mainly through a quota system 
that limited production.  The main goal of this act was to in effect create what is known 
as “parity” prices.  Limiting production artificially moved the crop prices towards a 
standard value.  For example if in 1920 a bushel of wheat could purchase 2 dollars worth 
of goods then in 1933 that same bushel should be worth the same amount.  In economic 
effect, it creates a price floor, a direct response to the plummeting prices during the Great 
Depression.
34
  Following in the New Deal was a set of 7 different subsidization policies, 
many which are still alive in some form today.  These 7 are: 
1. Price supports 
2. Subsidized distribution 
3. Export subsidies 
                                                 
34
 Pasour, 2005 page 87 
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4. Farm credits 
5. Land conservation 
6. Crop insurance 
7. Expansion in research35 
This increased involvement dwindled with the start of WWII and did not truly come back 
into effect until the 1950s with the reintroduction of the post WWII Farm Bills.  These 
farm bills were reauthorized every 5 or so years, and come into form with many different 
titles.  Between 1965 and 2008 there were 10 farm bills, with the 2014 bill marking the 
eleventh.
 36
  The ten bills are: 
1. Food and Agricultural Act of 1965 
2. Agricultural Act of 1970 
3. Agricultural and Consumer Protection Act of 1973 
4. Food and Agriculture Act of 1977 
5. Agriculture and Food Act of 1981 
6. Food Security Act of 1985 
7. Food, Agriculture, Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990 
8. Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act of 1996 
9. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 
10. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 
Each of these bills contain its own prominent feature, with some bills amending pre-
existing legislation and others passing more progressive legislation. Coupled with other 
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 Pasour Jr. and Rucker Plowshares and Pork Barrels page 90 
36
 CRS Report for Congress: Agriculture: A Glossary of Terms, Programs, and Laws, 
2005 Edition 
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agriculture related policy in the 1940s and 50s, the shift from more supply oriented 
policies to producer and consumer oriented policies can be seen.  The first farm bill, the 
Food and Agricultural Act of 1965 is important in that it repealed one of the more cost 
inefficient policies known as the Soil Bank.
37
  Though the model was used again in a 
subsequent conservation program in the 1980s, the retirement of acreage was seen as a 
more obsolete and wasteful use of arable land. 
 The Agricultural Act of 1970 furthered this progressive legislative trend by easing 
restrictions including quotas, allotments and planting restrictions.  In addition to this shift 
in commodity support policy, a new maximum payment amount was set at $55,000 
dollars per crop.
38
  Moving to the Act of 1973, the 4-year bill marked the first incidence 
of target pricing and deficiency payments, two of the major policies still in use today.  It 
did reduce payments from the 1970 bill down to $20,000 dollars, but compensated by 
enacting disaster payments as well as disaster reserves, and also amended the Food Stamp 
Act.
39
  The last farm bill of the 1970s came later in 1977, and increased price and income 
supports for grain crops, simplified further the eligibility requirements for the Food 
Stamp Program, and made the USDA the leading agency for agricultural research.
40
 
The last 3 farm bills before the major FAIR Act reforms in 1996 were the Agriculture 
and Food Act of 1981, Food Security Act of 1985, and the Food, Agriculture, 
Conservation, and Trade Act of 1990.  In 1981 the commodity programs were continued 
through 1985, and target prices were set grains, cotton, rice and wheat, but were 
subsequently frozen in 1984.  In 1990 several new agencies and programs were created 
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 CRS Report for Congress http://www.cnie.org/NLE/CRSreports/05jun/97-905.pdf  
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
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related to forest land stewardship and community forestry.  Additionally, safety standards 
in the handling of eggs and other products were increased in an effort to combat food-
borne illness.
41
  
The 1996 Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act marked the most 
significant change in governmental policy with the shift from direct government 
involvement to much more market oriented policies.  Over time, several methods were 
phased out in favor of more cost effective, targeted programs.  Major governmental 
supply controls were halted, including the idling of acreage, reduction of supply and 
grain storage in favor of more direct payments.
42
  Figure 7.1 below shows the change in 
governmental acreage idling over time up until 1994, around the time of the passage of 
the FAIR Act, which marked the major shift towards market oriented policies.  As the 
graph shows, between 1934-1954 there was no idling due to World War 2.  It picked up 
again following the war and continued into the 1970s.  The major decline during the 
1970s was due to the Soviet scare and subsequent grain shortages.  After that recovery it 
rose, but immediately began to decline over the 1984-1994 period, confirming the shift 
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away from this costly, inefficient policy.  
 
The three major channels through which the subsidies now flowed were price 
supports tied to production, income supports not tied and disaster payments.
43
  The 
mechanisms in which the funds were transferred were through direct payments, market 
loss assistance and loan deficiency payments.  Figure 1.2 below shows the trend of the 
three major payment types from 1990 through 2008.  As expected, direct payments and 
market loss payments did not begin until the FAIR Act took effect, and while price 
supports were used, their usage declined in the years prior to the FAIR Act, but increased 
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with the other two around the same time.   
 
A second major recent policy shift came in 2000 with the Agriculture Risk 
Protection Act.  This piece of legislation focused on the third facet, disaster payments, in 
the form of crop insurance.  In addition to the price stabilization and income protection 
policies set forth by the government, crop insurance is the third major area of government 
intervention.  Private insurance is often not available within the agricultural sector due 
what is known as uninsurable risk, meaning that it is often not profitable for insurance 
companies to insure farmland and crops.  In response to this, the government became to 
provider of most of the insurance policies.
44
   
With the restructuring of the governmental crop insurance program in 2000, 
higher insurance coverage became much more affordable to farmers, with approximately 
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$7 billion dollars outlayed by the CBO for the foreseeable future.  Additionally, the 
program has shown itself to be very successful, with 80% of the eligible acres covered 
under the program.
45
  Figure 3.1 below shows an interesting piece of information related 
to the crop insurance dilemma.  Prior to the easing of restrictions and costs to farmers, the 
coverage levels seen below were not attainable affordably.  With the passage of ARPA, 
coverage levels increased and farmers were able to take advantage of higher levels of 
protection.  Interestingly, the 70% coverage levels has the most acres covered under it, 
signifying that farmers are more than content with 70% coverage, and aren’t necessarily 
holding out for complete coverage.  
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The crop insurance program grew dramatically over the 2000-2010 period, but it has not 
been all good news.  The taxpayer costs grew along with the size of the program, and by 
2010 the costs were large enough to merit steps to rein them in.
46
     
Interest Groups and Agribusinesses 
 The last major area of influence in both the economic and political aspect of 
agricultural subsidies is the private sector and more narrowly business involvement.  
Interest groups lobby Congress for bills that will directly impact them and shape the 
economic argument in their favor, and businesses comingle with the government in ways 
that can and do cause negative externalities. 
 There are two main branches of interest groups, first the producer lobby and 
second agribusinesses.  Under these large umbrellas are different sub groups with a wide 
range of numbers and issues.  Within the bulk of these groups there are both conservative 
and liberal organizations that sometimes butt heads on legislation.  In the area of 
agricultural policy it is often the case that when one group benefits from a bill another 
loses out in some capacity.  Over time specific groups have amassed a large amount of 
political clout and the landscape today highlights the winners. 
 The first interest group sector is the producer lobby.  The strength of the lobby 
lies in the amount of farmers represented and their relative importance in the state they 
are in.  Consequently, as their numbers decline their power and influence also declines.  
Within the producer lobby there are three main groups, the general farm organizations, 
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commodity groups and cooperatives.  Each specific group focuses on a different aspect of 
the production side of the farm equation.
47
 
 The first group, the general farm organization is the widest ranging of the three 
groups, encompassing farmers in many different areas, not limited to food or commodity 
crops.  In this area there are two main organizations, the American Farm Bureau 
Federation and the National Farmers Union.  On the conservative side is the American 
Farm Bureau, which in this case advocate for more of a free market, minimal government 
approach.  The National Farmers Union on the other hand is more liberal, and its 
members are staunch supporters of price and income supports as well as major 
governmental involvement in price setting and crop insurance.
48
   
 Moving to the second group, the commodity group, the focus is much narrower.  
These commodity groups focus on a specific product or crop, and include not only the 
farmers and their crops but also the input producers, including the machinery makers and 
transportation companies.  Consequently, the relative strength of certain commodity 
lobbies rise and fall with their relative importance in the American agricultural sector.  
As it stands now, two of the most important organizations are the National Association of 
Wheat Growers and Corn growers, as they occupy a large portion of the land used.
49
   
 The final sector within the producer lobby is the cooperative.  These cooperatives 
harken back to the original cooperatives of farmers joining together to enhance their 
ability to market and sell their goods.  With respect to the lobbying aspect, these 
cooperatives function in much the same way, collectivizing in order to fight for shared 
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goals.  These cooperatives can have both narrow and wide aims, and are a major source 
of PAC contributions.   
 The second umbrella of interest groups is agribusinesses.  Unlike producer 
lobbies, these businesses share a close working relationship with the government, and are 
not just donating money to political figures in exchange for support.  Their revolving 
door relationship has been a big focus point for the problems currently facing America, 
not only in the agricultural sector but also in other sectors as well.  Similarly to the 
producer lobbies, agribusinesses are also split into three main groups, general 
organizations, commodity organizations and Washington Representatives.  These three 
share many characteristics in common with their counterparts above, but the breakdown 
of groups within the three larger sectors is slightly different.   
 The first group is the general organization, which encompasses groups such as the 
Chamber of Commerce, Frozen Foods and Grocery stores.  In this area the groups can be 
thought of as certain key areas of food sales.
50
  Moving to the second group, the 
commodity organization, the focus is similarly as narrow as the commodity producer 
lobby above.  These commodity groups focus on specific products as well, including the 
cotton, meat, milk, and grain commodities. The final sector within the agribusiness area 
is the Washington Representative.  These representatives represent specific firms, and 
directly lobby Congressmen and donate to their campaigns.
51
  
There is what is known as a revolving door relationship between business and 
government, and there are both positive and negative externalities stemming from this 
reciprocating relationship.  Many now argue that the problems currently facing America, 
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not only in the agricultural sector but also in other sectors as well, stems from this 
unchecked relationship. The positives of this are that the candidates are very 
knowledgeable in the area, allowing them to perform their jobs extremely well.  
However, there are some skeptics that short change this theory and argue that there is no 
incentive to perform their jobs well if it would potentially harm future job opportunities.  
Conclusion  
In conclusion, the four major areas of economic theory that affect the agricultural 
market--vertical integration, economies of scale, elasticity of markets and subsidization-- 
affect the agricultural sector in a myriad of ways, some positive and some negative.  
Through the processes of integration and expansion of scale and combined with the 
elasticity and variability within the market, government subsidization policies in the form 
of price controls and income supports has been the answer.   
 From the post WWII period onward, the legislation has evolved from the New 
Deal, heavy government intervention policies in the 1930s to the Farm Bills in the 60s 
and 70s to the much more market oriented policies in the FAIR Act and ARPA in the 90s 
and 2000s. The methods in which the government has supported the farmer has changed 
from more government and farmer centric policies to more hands off, market oriented 
policies.  Alongside this shift, the involvement and composition of the interest groups has 
also changed, growing considerably larger and consolidating power.   
The landscape today has shown there to be a tight relationship between 
government and business, leading to precarious positions for those in government who do 
not wish to jeopardize their futures in the private sector.  These economic and political 
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factors have all led up to the landscape of the agricultural sector today, and understanding 
the relationship is the key to moving forward in a progressive and positive way. 
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Chapter 3 
Data Set and Regression Analyses 
 
Introduction 
This chapter will contain multiple regressions analyses designed to determine the 
real correlation between subsidization and price and production.  The main question is 
what will happen to the agricultural sector if price supports and all other subsidies stop?  
Using the regressions in order to determine the independent variable coefficients, this 
chapter will conclude with an equation I developed which can then be used to calculate 
the effects.  My hypothesis is that production would be lower than it is today and the 
level of disparity between farm and non-farm incomes would be much higher.  Also, the 
price and market structure would be much different; prices would be higher and there 
would be even higher a level of monopolization within the agricultural sector.   
 The structure of this fourth chapter will be first an exposition on the data set, 
namely where the data was obtained, the nature and definitions of the variables and their 
importance to the model.  Second will be the bulk of the chapter containing the multiple 
regression analyses for the chosen crops, corn, cotton and soybeans.  I will also detail the 
methodology of my research as well discuss why I have chosen the crops I did.  The third 
and final section will be the empirical model containing the variable coefficients as well 
as the formula used to ascertain the effects of subsidies and more importantly what would 
happen should they cease to continue.   
The model as it is so far will have 4 separate regressions for each of the 3 crops 
(corn, wool, soybeans), one with price as the dependent variable and the others with 
production levels, subsidy amounts and gross revenue (price x production) as the other 
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dependent variables.  The independent variables included in the analyses are subsidy 
levels, import levels, export levels, net farm income, and either price/production 
depending on the regression.  There are also several nuances in the structure of the 
variables as well as their relationships to one another that I will expound on when 
beginning the analysis.   
Data Set and Descriptive Statistics 
 Within this paper, my economic analysis will focus on three distinct crops, corn, 
cotton and soybeans.  There are several specific reasons as to why these were the crops 
chosen, none more important than their overall importance in the agricultural sector of 
the economy.  Corn and cotton are the biggest food and non-food crops respectively.  
Their importance both historically as well as presently make them ideal candidates for an 
empirical analysis, and the data for both is very well catalogued and researched.  The 
soybean was the third crop chosen because much more recently it has become somewhat 
of a competitor to corn.  With the expanding biofuel market, both corn and soybean 
products can be used as fuel, and as direct competitors in that respect makes for an 
interesting comparison.   
 The data for the regression analyses comes from USDA agricultural crop 
databases for all three crops.  The subsidy figures come from the Environmental Working 
Group subsidy database.  The data will be in a time series format, spanning the 1995 to 
the 2012/2013 periods.  For soybeans, the data begins in 2000 and concludes in 2011, due 
to its more recent nature and with the 2012 and onward figures still under evaluation.  As 
stated above, the variables included for all three crops include price, production, import, 
export, and subsidy amounts, as well as a gross price*production figure.  Additionally, 
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the inclusion of the American Net Farm Income variable helps identify other mediating 
factors which trend along with price and production.  In analyzing the price and 
production variables together, I have decided to include a 1-year lag for price and 
production figures, as production one year might correspond to a shift in prices in the 
following year rather than the same year. 
The tables below outline the data for all three crops  
Table 1. Corn Data 
Year Production 
(Million 
Bushels) 
Exports 
(Million 
Bushels) 
Imports 
(Million 
Bushels) 
Subsidy 
Amount 
(million 
dollars) 
Weighted-
average farm 
price (dollars 
per bushel) 
NFI (Real 
2009 
Dollars) 
Price x 
Production 
1995 7400.051 56.589 16.487 2934.905 2.26 72250417 16724.11526 
1996 9232.557 45.655 13.261 2119.059 3.24 79362708 29913.48468 
1997 9206.832 38.214 8.81 2906.3 2.71 78033315 24950.51472 
1998 9758.685 50.401 18.806 5064.623 2.43 73141540 23713.60455 
1999 9430.612 49.191 14.744 7567.377 1.94 72353587 18295.38728 
2000 9915.051 49.313 6.824 8058.49 1.82 70051721 18045.39282 
2001 9502.58 48.383 10.14 5982.553 1.85 74080388 17579.773 
2002 8966.787 40.334 14.446 2498.438 1.97 59778179 17664.57039 
2003 10087.292 48.258 14.076 3439.944 2.32 83159504 23402.51744 
2004 11805.581 46.181 10.83 5308.631 2.42 93871157 28569.50602 
2005 11112.187 54.201 8.806 10138.944 2.06 94199225 22891.10522 
2006 10531.123 53.987 11.983 5796.967 2 72183779 21062.246 
2007 13037.875 61.913 20.021 3805.91 3.04 79505716 39635.14 
2008 12091.648 46.965 13.53 4194.188 4.2 88755793 50784.9216 
2009 13091.862 50.295 8.343 3778.97 4.06 73874299 53152.95972 
2010 12446.865 46.59 27.669 3495.34 3.55 96543061 44186.37075 
2011 12359.612 39.184 29.368 4663.99 5.18 122829596 64022.79016 
2012 10780.296 17.781 162.394 2702.462 6.22 127947766 67053.44112 
 
 
Table 2. Cotton Data 
Year Production 
(Million 
Bushels) 
Exports 
(Million 
Bushels) 
Imports 
(Million 
Bushels) 
Subsidy 
Amount 
(million 
dollars) 
Weighted-
average farm 
price (dollars 
per bushel) 
NFI (Real 
2009 
Dollars) 
Price x 
Production 
1995 17900 7675 408 211.64 72 72250417 1288800 
1996 18942 6865 403 807.49 76.5 79362708 1449063 
1997 18793 7500 13 744.71 70.5 78033315 1324906.5 
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1998 13918 4298 439 1317.97 66.2 73141540 921371.6 
1999 16968 6750 97 1944.9 61.7 72353587 1046925.6 
2000 17188 6740 16 2067.6 46.8 70051721 804398.4 
2001 20303 11000 21 3332.6 51.6 74080388 1047634.8 
2002 17209 11900 67 1950.393 32 59778179 550688 
2003 18255 13758 45 2550.96 45.7 83159504 834253.5 
2004 23251 14436 29 2229.214 63 93871157 1464813 
2005 23890 17673 28 3696.295 44.7 94199225 1067883 
2006 21588 12959 19 2979.752 49.7 72183779 1072923.6 
2007 19207 13634 12 2541.484 48.4 79505716 929618.8 
2008 12815 13261 0 1582.403 61.3 88755793 785559.5 
2009 12188 12037 0 2213.782 49.1 73874299 598430.8 
2010 18104 14376 9 828.339 62.8 96543061 1136931.2 
2011 15573 11714 19 1311.672 84.2 122829596 1311246.6 
2012 17315 13026 10 560.924 91.4 127947766 1582591 
2013 13105 10400 10  74.8 122110381 980254 
 
Table 3. Soybean Data 
Year Production 
(Million 
Bushels) 
Exports 
(Million 
Bushels) 
Imports 
(Million 
Bushels) 
Subsidy 
Amount 
(million 
dollars) 
Weighted-
average farm 
price (dollars 
per bushel) 
NFI (Real 
2009 
Dollars) 
Price x 
Production 
2000 2758 995.871 3.568 3234.051 4.63 70051721 12769.54 
2001 2891 1063.65 2.32 4602.195 4.54 74080388 13125.14 
2002 2756 1044.37 4.661 954.541 4.38 59778179 12071.28 
2003 2454 886.551 5.562 1493.547 5.53 83159504 13570.62 
2004 3124 1097.15 5.576 1449.036 7.34 93871157 22930.16 
2005 3068 939.878 3.372 1079.888 5.74 94199225 17610.32 
2006 3197 1116.49 9.034 1228.029 5.66 72183779 18095.02 
2007 2677 1158.82 9.871 1183.622 6.43 79505716 17213.11 
2008 2967 1279.29 1.3263 2048.182 10.1 88755793 29966.7 
2009 3359 1499.04 1.4598 1672.746 9.97 73874299 33489.23 
2010 3329 1501.30 1.4449 1554.841 9.59 96543061 31925.11 
2011 3056 1275 1.6136 2082.443 11.3 122829596 34532.8 
 
Regression analysis 
Each table below, 4 each for corn, cotton and soybeans, will contain individual 
explanations of the results.  After all 12 regression analyses, a cross-sectional analysis 
will be done, basically an analysis comparing one to each other to determine the true 
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relationship between subsidization and price and production.  I have chosen to do 
multiple regressions for each crop in order to mete out correlation bias, namely a question 
as to which variable might cause the other.  This is especially pertinent concerning the 
relationship between subsidization and price.  One the one hand, subsidization may and 
most likely does cause changes in prices.  However, in a world with price prediction, 
economic forecasts of future prices may also impact the political negotiations that 
allocate subsidy money.  So which of the two is to be believed, or are both at play?  In 
order to determine these parallel scenarios, I have analyzed the data together, and have 
made graphs charting the relationship between the two.  In these cases, there is no clear 
relationship for corn, a somewhat positive relationship for soybeans, and an oppositional 
(negative) relationship for cotton.   I have also run regressions with both price and 
subsidy amount as independent variables, which should, when analyzed together, come to 
form a complete picture.   
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The regression analysis done in this chapter uses the Gretl statistical software and 
runs regressions using ordinary least squares estimations.  There are several key figures 
to note within the regression tables, and they are the variable coefficients, the p-values, 
the R-squared statistic as well as the adjusted R-squared statistic.  First are the variables 
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and their coefficients.  There are 7 total variables for each of the three crops, with 4 
different regressions run.  Several of the variables are self explanatory, with production, 
export, import and subsidy variables denoting the amount in each category.  Weighted-
average farm price can be better thought of as average price of the crop throughout each 
year. The price of each crop should be noted as nominal in price, not indexed to inflation 
or set to a base year.  The final two variables are net farm income (NFI) and gross 
revenue.  Gross revenue is simply price*production, which yields the total amount of 
money generated for each crop.  NFI is the total farmer income for all farmers for each 
year.   Unlike price, net farm income (NFI) is set to real 2009 dollars, indicating its real 
vs. nominal nature and its 2009 base year.   
Moving to the variable coefficients column, the values tell us that for a 1% 
increase in the independent variable, the total increase or decrease of the dependent 
variable would change by that coefficient value on average, holding the other variables 
constant.  It must be said however that this only holds for variables with statistical 
significance, as those without significance cannot be said to have that relationship.  For 
the p-values specifically, it is important to note that asterisk denotations indicate 
statistical significance for the .1, .05 and .01 levels.  
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Table 4. Corn Gross Crop Value as Dependent Variable 
 
The first regression uses the gross price*production figure as the dependent 
variable, with exports, imports, subsidy amount and NFI as the independent variables.  
Interestingly, there was only one statistically significant variable, NFI.  Its coefficient of 
7.5*10
-5
 seems small, but it is important to note that the scale of these variables is in the 
millions, so a small change in the independent variable can still yield larger results when 
put into context.  In this case, the coefficient indicates that a 1 unit increase in NFI would 
lead to an increase of 7.5*10
-5
 for the gross price*production figure.  Another notable 
figure to look at is the R-squared statistic.  The R-squared statistic measures the amount 
of variation that can be accounted for within this analysis.  In this case, at .39, only 39% 
of the variation within the gross price*production figure can be said to come from these 
independent variables.  Looking critically, this means that there are potentially other 
variables not included that might hold more of a correlation than the ones listed here.  On 
the other hand, it is not uncommon for R-squared percentages to be around this 30-50% 
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range, as there are certain outliers and inconsistencies that can sometimes diminish the 
explained variation.   
Table 5. Corn Price as Dependent variable 
 
The next regression uses the corn price as the dependent variable, with exports, 
imports, subsidy amount, NFI and production amount as the independent variables.  
Unlike the first regression, there are 3 statistically significant results in this run.  For all 
three-subsidy amount, NFI and production there is a statistically significant correlation 
with price.  It is important to note however, that this correlation does not necessarily 
imply causality.  In this case, there might even be reciprocal relationships between the 
independent and dependent variables that hinder any real analyses.   
The coefficients for these three variables indicate a negative relationship between 
subsidization and price, which is to be expected.  As subsidization goes up, the price will 
go down as the increased subsidization will lead to higher production, which in turn 
increases supply, thereby decreasing price.  For the other two variables, the correlation is 
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positive; meaning as they go up price goes up as well.  However, I do believe there to be 
some reciprocity in these relationships, meaning that it may be the case that price is 
impacting NFI and Production, not the other way around.  In this way price increases 
would lead to more production and a higher NFI as the higher price would entice more 
production to occur.  In any case, one must be careful to not take the data at face value 
alone, but must think critically in order to ascertain the real meaning behind it.  Notably, 
the R-squared statistic in this case is very high, at .869, meaning that almost 87% of the 
variation in price can be accounted for by these independent variables.  Looking 
critically, this means that this set of variables do well to explain the changes in price on a 
year-to-year basis. 
Table 6. Corn Production as Dependent Variable 
 
 The third regression takes production amount of corn as the dependent variable.  
Unlike with price, production does not see as much in the way of statistically significant 
relationships.  The only significance comes from the price independent variable, but I 
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believe that to be from price’s heavy impact on future production.  As indicated with the 
data tables above, there is a one year lag in order to see price’s effect on production the 
year after, and it is unsurprising that it is significant, and so high as well.  In this 
regression a 1-dollar increase in crop price per bushel leads to 1303.64 increases in 
production, which is in millions of bushels.  In this way one can see the tremendous 
impact even a small change in price can do.  Going from say 4 to 5 dollars a bushel leads 
to over a billion more bushels being produced in order to try and get some of the profits.  
Table 7. Corn Subsidy Amount as Dependent Variable 
 
 The final corn regression takes subsidy amount as the dependent variable.  As 
Table 7 shows, both NFI and crop price are statistically significant, with price having a 
negative relationship and NFI a positive one.  Intuition would say that this is to be 
expected, as when price goes down subsidization goes up due to the price support 
policies in place by the government.  On the other hand it must be noted that this could 
also be a reciprocal relationship in that increased subsidization makes the price go down, 
similar to Table 5’s regression with price as the dependent variable.   
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 Looking at all four of the corn regressions together, the picture painted is one of 
very close relationships between price, production and subsidization.  Price as an 
independent variable was significant in all instances, and NFI was also a great predictor.  
While exports and imports were never significant, it is interesting to think about why.  As 
a crop, corn is the biggest food crop in the US, used in a variety of different industries.  
Intrinsically, import figures are going to be very low as such a major crop would not need 
to be imported.  As well the relationship between import amounts and the other variables 
would not be that important.   
 Moving to cotton, I hypothesized that these regressions would behave in a similar 
manner to corn.  Being the biggest non-food crop, the close ties between price, 
production and subsidization should be present.  Additionally, as cotton is a majorly 
exported crop, with the US exporting almost 50% of the world’s cotton, I also expect 
export numbers to also play a statistically significant role in the regression analyses.   
Table 8. Cotton Gross Crop value as Dependent Variable 
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The first regression again used the gross price*production figure as the dependent 
variable, with exports, imports, subsidy amount and NFI as the independent variables.  
Interestingly and similarly to corn, there was only one statistically significant variable, in 
this case the constant.  Unlike corn, NFI was not significant.  The R-squared statistic  in 
this case is notable as at .27, only 27% of the variation within the gross price*production 
figure can be said to come from these independent variables.  Looking critically, this 
means that there is probably other variables not included that might hold more of a 
correlation than the ones listed here.  Moving forward, it will be important to see whether 
this remains the case or if the issue just lies with this regression’s structure and not with 
the variables.   
Table 9. Cotton Price as Dependent Variable 
 
Moving to the price regression for cotton, there are three significant independent 
variables.  NFI and subsidy amount remain positive and negatively respectively similar to 
the corn price regression, which makes sense given the nature of the subsidization policy 
   50
within the US.  What is unique about this regression is the negative relationship between 
price and export amount.  In this case as export amounts increase, price goes down.  
Notably, the R-squared statistic in this case is very high, at .91, meaning that 91% of the 
variation in cotton’s price can be accounted for by these independent variables.  This 
means that this set of variables do well to explain the changes in price on a year-to-year 
basis. 
Table 10. Cotton Production as Dependent Variable 
 
The third cotton regression shows no significant relationships between the 
independent and dependent variables.  This is similar in a way to corn, but even so price 
was not significant as it was for corn.  The closest variable to being statistically relevant 
was subsidy amount, with a p-value of .11, higher than the .10 thresholds.  Again, the R-
squared was not reasonably low, but at only .36 there can be other variables that predict 
the variation in production amounts.  
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Table 11. Cotton Subsidy Amount as Dependent Variable 
 
The final cotton regression takes subsidy amount as the dependent variable.  In 
this case only the constant and cotton price were significant, with price having a negative 
relationship.  As stated above with corn, intuition would say that this is to be expected, as 
when price goes down subsidization goes up due to the price support policies in place by 
the government.  On the other hand it must be noted that this could also be a reciprocal 
relationship in that increased subsidization makes the price go down.   
Table 12. Soybeans Gross Crop Value as Dependent Variable 
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Table 13. Soybeans Price as Dependent Variable 
 
 Tables 12 and 13 show some promising statistical significances, mostly 
concerning exports.  For both regressions export amount was relevant, highlighting the 
major role exports have in both cotton production and price.  Strengthening this 
argument, the R-squared statistic for the price regression was .92 meaning that almost all 
of the variation in price can be accounted for.  Given that only exports and NFI were 
statistically significant, it is easy to conclude that they play a major role in determining 
price levels.  In the price regression NFI was also significant, but I hesitate to conclude 
that it is really NFI that raises price or if it is the other way around.  As prices increase it 
is only logical that farm income would increase as well, as farmers would receive higher 
compensation for their crops.  In this way it can be said for all three crops to be the case  
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Table 14. Soybeans Production as Dependent Variable 
 
Table 15. Soybeans Subsidy Amount as Dependent Variable 
 
 The last two regressions concerning production and subsidy amount as dependent 
variables both found no statistically significant results.  This was interesting, and I can 
venture several reasons as to why this is the case.  While corn and cotton go as far back 
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as 1995 in the data, yielding 17 observations, soybeans only contain data from 2000-
2011.  In this way it is even more surprising to find statistical relevance at all given the 
small number of observations.  Additionally, soybeans are relatively new to the stage 
compared to corn, signifying that there may be less subsidization in that area, leading to a 
much looser relationship between subsidization and price and production.   
Looking across all three crops, there are several similarities that lead to some 
general conclusions.  For both corn and cotton price and production were very closely 
related, as was NFI for all three crops.  This indicates that the agricultural sector as a 
larger entity is not as starkly diversified in its relationships as one might think, and even 
across food and non-food crops the relationship between subsidization and output can be 
seen.   
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Chapter 4 
Pros and Cons of Price Supports 
 
Introduction  
This chapter will outline the pros and cons of price and income supports.  The 
main point of this chapter will be to show that there are both positive and negative 
attributes with these two means of subsidy support.  I have outlined below 4 distinct pros 
and cons of price and income support subsidies. 
Pros 
1. Creates price stability 
2. Helps support farmer’s incomes 
3. Increases political involvement 
4. Elastic vs. Inelastic nature of the market spurs an economic power struggle 
Cons 
1. Price supports lead to higher commodity prices, which is bad for consumers. 
2. Price support programs cost money. 
3. The government may not accurately support the different crops. 
4. Overproduction can lead to expansion in capacity when there might not need to be 
expansion. 
In the narrative of agricultural subsidization, the two major political factions come 
down as either in favor of a more highly involved government or in favor of a much freer 
market.  By looking at both the positives and negatives of the current policies in place, 
the cost benefit analysis can be determined and the overall discussion of where to go 
from here can be discussed.  Overall, I believe that while there are certainly some 
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drawbacks, they can be mediated and moving forward there can be a comprehensive 
policy platform that can both achieve the economic goals of the government while at the 
same time not impinging on the free market or personal/ collective rights.   
Pros and Cons of Price and Income Supports 
Price Stability vs. Higher Prices  
The first positive achievement of the current free market oriented price and 
income supports is the stabilization of crop markets.  As the agricultural market expanded 
throughout the 20
th
 century through increased in demand and production capacity, the 
larger market also increased in unpredictability.
52
  Food markets in particular fall victim 
to certain trends of unpredictability and much higher booms and busts.  As Gardner wrote 
in his book American Agriculture, food is much more cyclically sensitive, meaning that 
supply and demand are much more responsive to market forces.
53
  This leads to much 
bigger market booms and busts.  While promoters of the free market might hail the large 
upswings, the downturns have devastating effects.  As was seen in times of economic 
hardship such as the Great Depression, low demand can lead to rotting crops and farmers 
being unable to sell their product.  This in turn puts farmers out of business.   
 In response to this unpredictability, the government had an incentive to stabilize 
prices, both by setting a price floor and indexing prices to a set base level.  This goal of 
supporting prices and farm incomes began in the 1930s with several new deal policies, 
and became explicitly more important in the 1970s.
54
  Over that 40-year 1930-1970 
period, the policies implemented were impactful, but not necessarily economically 
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efficient.  Certain production control programs that were designed to bolster falling 
prices, such as acreage retirements and government purchasing of grain were seen as 
unnecessarily inefficient, and the transition moved toward more market oriented policies 
in the 1990s, as I discussed in the previous chapter.
55
   
 While the bolstering of prices is definitely a positive boost for farmer’s 
production and incomes, the drawback comes in the form of higher food prices, which is 
bad for consumers.  The impact of these market-oriented policies designed to set base 
levels for crops is that in certain instances the price is higher than the market equilibrium 
price.  The flaw in this case is that when prices are set to parity levels, it is often the 
wrong level.  As Knutson, Penn and Boehm write in Agriculture and Food Policy, the 
parity price level is set to equal purchasing power of 1910-1914.
56
  This means that the 
cost per unit of the crop will be able to buy the same amount of goods it was able to buy 
in 1910-1914.  While this may sound good on the surface, there are more hidden effects.  
By setting prices to a level so far in the past, the economic and productive gains since 
then are not reflected in the price.  This means that while it now costs less per unit to 
produce a certain crop thanks to increasingly effective fertilizer and genetic 
modifications, the costs to consumers do not necessarily go down accordingly.  The 
producers realize the entirety of the savings, while the consumer sees none.   
 Painting the picture of the stark contrast between price stability vs. higher prices 
for consumers is somewhat disingenuous.  While it is enticing to say that the consumers 
have not realized any cost savings, it is not the case when looking at the data.  There are 
several key economic figures that paint a much more positive picture for consumers, 
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indicating that there is not just a reaping of profits by producers alone, but that consumers 
also have benefited over time.  Firstly, the percentage of disposable income spent on food 
has gone way down from 41% to 12% over time.
57
  And secondly, food prices have 
actually gone down overall (35%) throughout the past several decades.  Now, is it 
plausible to say that these downtrends have been due to the policy decisions put in place 
by the government or is it in spite of them?  Overall, I believe that the benefits in this 
case do outweigh the risks.  The increased stability has certainly positively benefitted 
both the industry and the market as a whole, and even though setting prices to a level so 
far in the past might diminish cost savings towards consumers, there have still been 
realized effects in the form of lower prices and lower amounts of income spent on food. 
Income Support vs. Costs 
 In addition to price stability policies, income support to farmers has been the 
second major policy goal of the US government.  Throughout history farm incomes have 
been lower than non-farm incomes, and in response the government has sought to 
redistribute income in a sense towards these low-income farmers.
58
 Falling prices also 
have a tremendous impact on farmer income, which in a very real way ties together both 
price supports and income payments.  With the Great Depression came a plummeting 
prices, down 55% between 1929-1933.
59
  The New Deal in this respect painted farmers as 
a very weak group, with little to no bargaining power.
60
  From then onward, the 
government has aggressively supported farmers growing major crops, as well as 
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increased and stabilized earnings over time through the passage of Farm Bills throughout 
the 1950s-1990s.
61
 
 While this depiction of farmers as a weak group both economically and politically 
has been true historically, there is much more doubt today as to whether or not it is still 
true.  Knutson, Penn and Boehm highlight this in their work by noting the major 
arguments against this government involvement in favor of a much freer market.  The 
argument presented is that both price and income supports are no longer necessary, as 
farmers’ incomes are fine now.62  Additionally, with the increasing average size of farms, 
along with the increase in automation, the necessity of the same amount of support has 
been challenged.
63
  Thirdly, many of the concerns that farmers are not represented 
politically have gone away with the introduction of lobbyists and interest groups in 
Washington.   
 This is one area of current policy where I struggle to see current merit in the 
structure of income supports.  I accept more the premise that farmers are in less need of 
generous income supports, given the successful nature of price supports along with other 
factors.  With the rise of industrial farms, coupled with the heavy automation today, there 
is less and less labor required to farm a given area.  This leads me to believe more that 
smaller farms and farmers are being pushed out of the marker and that big business is 
reaping the subsidies, which in my mind is unnecessary.  There is certain room to adapt 
this policy to help the small farmer, which I do agree is a noble cause, but to increasingly 
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increase income supports through direct payments to parties that are generating massive 
profits is unnecessary and not a wise decision.    
 Beginning all the way back with the New Deal programs, government 
involvement and by extension government expenditures have increased dramatically.  
From 1929-1935 alone the USDA expenditures went up from $200 million dollars to $1.2 
billion dollars.
64
  This continued well into the 1970s and 80s, with additional programs 
such as acreage allotments and grain conservation costing even more through lost 
revenue and opportunity costs.  The table below shows overall subsidy amounts from the 
1995 through 2011 period, with each year growing more and more.
65
  Just over the last 15 
years the total amount spent on crop subsidies was $277,672,554,138 dollars, over a 
quarter trillion dollars.   
Year Overall Subsidy Amount Subsidy Amount as a 
percentage of GDP 
1995 8,131,563,163 0.07% 
1996 8,255,869,060 0.07% 
1997 8,357,895,525 0.07% 
1998 13,303,944,390 0.11% 
1999 22,964,171,712 0.18% 
2000 24,740,234,687 0.19% 
2001 24,247,372,508 0.19% 
2002 14,068,373,158 0.10% 
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2003 18,116,222,690 0.13% 
2004 15,341,958,208 0.10% 
2005 24,309,014,460 0.16% 
2006 17,035,215,324 0.11% 
2007 14,430,758,109 0.09% 
2008 17,032,492,997 0.11% 
2009 16,321,523,606 0.11% 
2010 15,364,353,500 0.10% 
2011 15,651,591,041 0.10% 
 
When discussing subsidization of agriculture, the staggering amount of money 
spent to ensure stable prices and high farmer income does come at a cost.  In this case it 
is exactly that, the costs of the programs.  Billions of dollars spent per year have to come 
from somewhere, and that normally winds up coming from the taxpayers.  In this 
structure, it is not always going to be feasible or wise to spend this money on subsidies 
over other programs, and in times of economic hardship when the American people need 
the money the most it becomes a moral argument as to why they should pay out.  In 
recent years there have been attempts to rein in skyrocketing costs, but not in a fashion 
that would cut subsidizations in any meaningful ways.  Looking to the future, the cost 
benefit analysis must be done in order to see whether it is sound policy to continue such 
costly programs. 
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Political Activism vs. Moneyed Interests 
Political activism from farmers and farm groups has been a great benefit with 
respect to political activism. Interest groups lobby Congress for bills that will directly 
impact them and shape the economic argument in their favor, and representation in 
Washington is something all major groups in Washington should strive for.   However, 
when businesses comingle with the government in ways that cross the boundaries 
between the just and unjust, moneyed interests can and do cause negative externalities. 
 The two main branches of interest groups, the producer lobbies and agribusinesses 
have amassed a large amount of political clout and the landscape today highlights the 
winners. The strength of the producer lobby lies in the amount of farmers represented and 
their relative importance in the state they are in.  Consequently, as their numbers decline 
their power and influence also declines.  This begs the question of why aid has gone up 
even though the number of farmers has gone down.  One of the two main farmers unions, 
The National Farmers Union is a staunch supporter of price and income supports as well 
as major governmental involvement in price setting and crop insurance.
66
  This is a 
particularly strong reason as to why aid has continued.  Through donations and the 
political games of Washington, the NFU can sway the outcomes on bills that will directly 
influence its members.     
 Moving to a second politically active group, commodity groups who focus on a 
specific product or crop, including input producers, machinery makers and transportation 
companies, their relative strength rises and falls with their relative importance in the 
American agricultural sector and the relative strength of the sector as a whole.  Increasing 
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and continued subsidization in this case will only strengthen their sales and increase their 
productive capacities, which spells out why many commodity groups, like farmers 
unions, are in favor of continuing the current policies in place.     
Looking at the current political landscape from a more cynical perspective, there 
seems to be what is known as a revolving door relationship between business and 
government, which holds both positive and negative consequences.  Many now argue that 
the problems currently facing America, not only in the agricultural sector but also in 
other sectors as well, stems from this unchecked relationship.  Below is a picture 
depicting the relationship between the Federal Government and the Monsanto 
Corporation, a leader in genetically modified seeds and pesticides.  As it shows, lobbyists 
on Monsanto’s side move to representatives and consultants for the Federal Government, 
and Congressmen and staff members move into consultant positions within Monsanto.   
The positives of this relationship are that the candidates are very knowledgeable 
in the area, allowing them to perform their jobs extremely well.  However, there are some 
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skeptics that short change this theory and argue that there is no incentive to perform their 
jobs well if it would potentially harm future job opportunities.  For example, why would 
someone working for the FDA push for stricter regulation if it would harm Monsanto, 
when they plan on potentially working for Monsanto in the future?  The landscape today 
has shown there to be a tight relationship between government and business, leading to 
precarious positions for those in government who do not wish to jeopardize their futures 
in the private sector.  These economic and political factors have are ever important in 
today’s uncompromising political climate and understanding the relationship is the key to 
moving forward in a progressive and positive way. 
Government Estimation and the Problem of Overproduction 
 While most of the issues discussed above have both positive and negative 
attributes, two specific cons of price supports are the problems of accurate support and 
over/underproduction.  First, when the government institutes policies such as price and 
income supports, there are measurable effects on the specific crops the policies are 
purported to protect and promote.  In this way, if the government inaccurately supports 
the crops by either setting prices too high or too low, the economy is negatively affected.  
This brings about case number two, overproduction.  In the case of the government 
overshooting the market price, overproduction occurs, which brings along with it its own 
set of externalities.   
  Knutson, Penn and Boehm highlight the first of the two problems in their book 
Agriculture and Food Policy.  They identify what they call the “price support dilemma”, 
which states that price supports lead to increased production, which in turn leads to 
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perverse incentives that further perpetuates government involvement.
67
  In this way, price 
supports contain an inherent flaw in that if they are not matched exactly what would be 
the true equilibrium price there will be over/underestimations of demand, leading to 
overproduction or shortages.   
Elastic vs. Inelastic Markets and the Struggle for Economic Power 
The elasticity of demand for crops within the agricultural market plays an 
important role in the determination of whether or not the government should grant 
subsidies and directly intervene in the market.  As was stated in chapter 2, in economics, 
elasticity indicates how much of one good will be sold when another variable is changed.  
This can be on the supply side or demand side.  For the supply side the question would be 
how much more will I produce and the demand side would be how much more will be 
demanded.  Within these parameters, price elasticity of demand is almost always 
negative, meaning as the price of the good goes up; the demand for it will go down. 
Within the agricultural sector, this negative price elasticity can be seen.  The 
elasticity of demand for crops according to Gardner in American Agriculture in the 20
th
 
Century is -.2, meaning that for every unit of price increase the demand for the good will 
go down by .2 units.
68
  Within the market itself, the price of these crops is also very 
sensitive.  In this sense, the power in the dynamic is not in the hands of the consumers, as 
they are at the mercy of volatile price swings.  These price swings, coupled with the 
inelastic nature of the market leads to demand inconsistencies, as well as the potential for 
consumers to wind up in positions where food prices could be so high as to not be 
affordable or too low, in which case there would be food shortages.   
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The picture painted by these three economic effects is not economically or 
politically ideal.  The market is unpredictable, big corporate farms are pushing out the 
small farmers, consumers are being forced to buy at artificially higher prices and there is 
no private sector insurance for farmers in case of crop disaster.  These negative 
externalities beg for resolution, and the answers dating all the way back to the New Deal 
era and used still today is subsidies.  This is arguable the biggest positive factor for both 
price stabilization and income support.  The price stabilization methods put in place shift 
the power back to the consumer, who now does not have to worry about these massive 
swings.  The markets have stabilized, which in turn stabilize demand.  So in this case not 
only do the consumers benefit, but also companies.  Their profit horizons are more easily 
predictable, spurring innovation, investment and expansion.   
Conclusion 
 In conclusion, the narrative so far has been one of a rabid, unstable agricultural 
market, replete with negative externalities as well as disadvantaged consumers and 
farmers alike.  These negative externalities have been dealt with for the past 80 years 
through price and income supports stemming from government intervention.  Earlier in 
history, the benefits of these policy decisions were seen to far outweigh the risks.  
However, recently politics has split into two major factions, one side in favor of a more 
highly involved government and the other the opposite, in favor of a much freer market. 
Overall, the arguments presented regarding the current state of affairs do not mean that 
these price and income programs should be scrapped entirely; I think that that would be a 
huge detriment to the agricultural sector as well as the larger economy.  However, I 
believe that while there are certainly some drawbacks, they can be mediated.   
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By adapting and slightly modifying the policies in place, costs can be brought 
back under control and rampant political influence can be marginalized in favor of a 
system that benefits both sides evenly as opposed to solely moneyed interests. Moving 
forward there can be a comprehensive policy platform that can both achieve the 
economic goals of the government while at the same time not subjecting consumers, 
small farmers and others to the growing agribusiness sector. 
In the next chapter in this thesis, I will closely analyze the current state of affairs 
in both a political and economic light.  This section will include the formulaic data 
obtained regarding production and exports, and as was said in chapter three project out 
into the future where we are headed now and where we could be headed without 
subsidies.  Coupled with this, the most recent farm bills passed in 2008 and 2013 will be 
deconstructed to see what, if anything, has changed.  Finally, I will move towards the 
concluding chapter in this thesis, namely what is next for American agriculture?  I will 
prescribe both policy recommendations as well as give my thoughts on a broader take on 
agriculture and its place in American life and whether or not the system of conglomerate 
farming is necessarily the best policy moving into a more globalized, mechanized future.   
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Chapter 5 
Where we are today, and where we’re going 
 
Introduction  
After the previous chapter highlighted the relationships between price and 
production with other independent variables, it is key not only to look at the history of the 
factors, but to also project out to see what to expect in the coming years.  In this way I 
will use the regression coefficients to structure a formula used to ascertain the effects of 
subsidies and more importantly what would happen should they cease to continue.  For 
each of the three crops there will be both a speculation using current subsidy figures that 
will continue to grow at the rate they have been during the past decade as well as a 
speculation where subsidy amounts will be zero.  The second part of the chapter will look 
into the most recent farm bill from 2008 as well as the two farm bills that failed to pass in 
2013.  This will also help give insight to the future of the agricultural sector and how 
Congress and different interest groups are moving forward.  
Growth Rates 
 Using the same data from the regression for all three crops, I graphed the change 
in the variable values over time.
69
  Using an exponential trend line function, I found the 
average growth rates for each of the variables, exports, imports, production, subsidy, and 
price.  Below is a table outlining all of the growth rates for corn, cotton and soybeans.   
Table 1 Growth rates 
 Production  Exports 
 
Imports 
 
Subsidy  Price  NFI  
Corn 2.50% -2.10% 6.78% 0.36% 5.35% 2.66% 
 
   
-12.7% 
since 2005 
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Cotton -1% 4.37% -32.40% 3.28% 0.58% 
  
   
-24% since 
2005 
  Soybeans 1.51% 3.68 -0.89% -0.34% 8.71% 
 Two important figures are the subsidy growth rates in both corn and cotton.  While the 
overall average growth rates are both positive, they have both gone down substantially 
since 2005, indicating a shift in policy around that time that curtailed subsidy support.  
Another interesting figure is Net Farm Income, which has grown 2.66% over the 1995-
2013 period.  This shows that farmers have been doing better, with incomes rising.   
 Using these growth rates, it is easy to roughly extrapolate out into the near future, 
keeping in mind that the speculative values would only hold given no major shifts in 
policy.  Table 2 below shows the speculative values for all three crops.   
Table 2. Speculations 
 
Year 
Production 
(Million 
Bushels) 
Exports 
(Million 
Bushels) 
Imports 
(Million 
Bushels) 
Subsidy 
Amount 
(million 
dollars) 
Weighted-
average farm 
price (dollars 
per bushel) 
NFI (Real 
2009 
Dollars) 
Corn 2014 14273.275 31.08 37.373 2799.75063 7.258615 125358517.1 
 2015 14630.107 30.43 39.90688 2900.54165 7.646950903 128693053.7 
 2016 14995.860 29.79 42.61257 3004.96115 8.056062776 132116288.9 
 2017 15370.756 29.17 45.50170 3113.13975 8.487062134 135630582.2 
 2018 15755.025 28.55 48.58672 3225.21278 8.941119958 139238355.7 
 2019 16148.901 27.95 51.88090 3341.32044 9.419469876 142942096 
 2020 16552.623 27.37 55.39843 3461.60798 9.923411515 146744355.7 
 2021 16966.439 26.79 59.15444 3586.22587 10.45431403 150647755.6 
 2022 17390.600 26.23 63.16511 3715.33000 11.01361983 154654985.9 
 2023 17825.365 25.68 67.44771 3849.08188 11.60284849 158768808.5 
        
Cotton 2014 12973.950 10854.48 6.76 579.322307 75.23384  
 2015 12844.210 11328.82 4.56976 598.324078 75.67019627  
 2016 12715.768 11823.89 3.089157 617.949108 76.10908341  
 2017 12588.610 12340.59 2.088270 638.217839 76.55051609  
 2018 12462.724 12879.88 1.411670 659.151384 76.99450909  
 2019 12338.097 13442.73 0.954289 659.085469 77.44107724  
 2020 12214.716 14030.18 0.645099 659.019560 77.89023549  
 2021 12092.569 14643.29 0.436087 658.953658 78.34199885  
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 2022 11971.643 15283.21 0.294795 658.887763 78.79638245  
 2023 11851.927 15951.08 0.199281 658.821874 79.25340147  
        
        
Soy 2012 3102.146 1321.92 1.613438 2082.2347 12.28423  
 2013 3148.988 1370.57 1.613277 2082.0265 13.35418643  
 2014 3196.538 1421.00 1.613115 2081.81833 14.51733607  
 2015 3244.805 1473.30 1.612954 2081.6101 15.78179604  
 2016 3293.802 1527.51 1.612793 2081.4019 17.15639048  
 2017 3343.538 1583.73 1.612632 2081.1938 18.65071209  
 2018 3394.026 1642.01 1.612470 2080.9857 20.27518911  
 2019 3445.276 1702.43 1.612309 2080.7776 22.04115808  
 2020 3497.299 1765.08 1.612148 2080.5695 23.96094295  
While the price and production variables have also been expanded into the short 
future, it is still important to use the variable coefficients on the independent variables to 
see what figures we get.  For the corn price dependent regression, the coefficients were -
.018, .0077, -.0001, 2.7*10
-8
, and .0002 for exports, imports, subsidy, NFI and production 
respectively.  Looking at the year 2023, using these coefficients with their corresponding 
variable values the price comes out to 7.86.  This is around $4 below the projected value 
that used the average growth rate.  This can possibly be explained through other variables 
not included in the regression.   The same types of differences are found in the other 
regression estimations.   
Moving to the main focus, that being the estimated production and price figures 
when subsidy amounts were set to zero, the results are interesting.  
 Price without 
subsidy 
Price following 
projected growth 
Production 
without subsidy 
Production following 
projected growth 
Corn $7.48 11.6 19677.42 17825.37 
Cotton 106.6 79.25 15112.1 11851.93 
Soybeans 17.23 23.96 3035.16 3497.3 
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The results of the cancellation of the subsidization programs are interesting, and 
not at all surprising.  With one of the main goals of current agricultural policy being price 
supports, it is not surprising to see the prices of both corn and soybeans go down.  
Interestingly, the price of cotton went up, indicating an opposite trend.  I believe this to 
be due to the major role of exporting in the cotton industry.  With subsidization helping 
control input and other prices, a lack of those subsidies would force the price up in 
response to the higher production costs.   
Moving to production figures, all three crops shows similar, smaller changes.  For 
corn and cotton, the production figures increased while for soybeans it decreased.  I 
believe the increase in cotton stems from the higher projected price of the crop, allowing 
for a higher production amount yielding much greater profits.  Similarly for corn, the 
reduction in price coupled with the slight increase in production leads to a very similar 
gross revenue, showing that the industry would not collapse from an elimination of 
subsidization.   
Political Landscape Today 
The 2008 farm bill is the second most recent farm bill to become a law.  Both the 
House of Representative and Senate’s 2013 bills were shot down in the House, and the 
most recent bill was passed only 3 short months ago in February of 2014.  Below is a 
table outlining the expenditures in the several major areas, including commodities (price 
and income support programs), conservation (land retirement, etc.) and crop insurance.  
Those three areas, which have been the major ones I have focused on as they pertain to 
direct subsidization over food aid programs and others alone total 194.1 billion dollars.  
Additionally, Nutrition as a sector tops the list with 432.2 billion dollars outlaid into 
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things like the Food Stamp and SNAP programs among others.  This shows that over the 
past decade the flow of government money into the agricultural sector has not slowed 
down.   
Estimated cost of farm bill mandatory programs-Congressional Budget Office (CBO) baseline 
assumptions 1/ 
Programs 
(A) 
Estimated 
cost under 
March 2008 
baseline 
(B) 
Estimated 
cost for 
baseline 
plus 2008 
farm bill 
cost 
Billion dollars 
Commodities 75.8 74.8 
Conservation 52.5 57.7 
Crop insurance 66.1 61.6 
Agricultural trade programs, new horticulture and organic 
spending, and supplemental disaster assistance in the 2008 farm 
bill 
3.2 7.1 
Nutrition 432.2 441.8 
Other spending/offsets 6.5 -3.0 
   Total 636.2 640.0 
1/ Excludes funding for discretionary programs, which is provided through annual 
appropriations. 
2/ Outlays over 10 years 
Source: CBO projections for outlays. 
Source: http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-commodity-policy/program-
provisions/cost-of-2008-farm-bill.aspx#.U2rZw-ZdXu8 
 
Moving to the direct payment aspect, below are the rates for corn, cotton and soybeans.  
As the USDA notes, “Base acres and payment yields are unchanged from those specified 
in the 2002 Farm Act…DP rates are unchanged from the 2002 Farm Act. However, the 
   73
DP rate is reduced by 20 percent for producers electing to enroll in the ACRE 
program”.70   
Direct payment rates 
Commodity Unit 
Direct payment 
rate 
Direct payment rate if 
enrolled in ACRE 
Corn Bushel $0.28 $0.22 
Upland cotton Pound $0.0667 $0.0534 
Soybeans Bushel $0.44 $0.35 
The second major economic program that has been continued is counter-cyclical 
payments.  These, remember, are payments made to farmers only when prices fall below 
the threshold, as a way to stabilize farm income.  As was the case for direct payments, not 
much has changed from the 2002 farm bill.  Below again is the rates for the three main 
crops I have looked at in this thesis, corn, cotton and soybeans.
71
   
Target prices 
Commodity Unit CY 2008 CY 2009 CY 2010-12 
Corn Bushel $2.63 $2.63 $2.63 
Upland cotton Pound $0.71 $0.71 $0.71 
Soybeans Bushel $5.80 $5.80 $6.00 
 
Agricultural Act of 2014 
The 2014 Farm Bill is a major change from the previous legislation, with the 
Direct Payment, Countercyclical Payment, and the Average Crop Revenue Election 
(ACRE) program all being repealed.  Instead, two new programs will take the place of 
                                                 
70
 http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-commodity-policy/program-
provisions/direct-payments.aspx#.U2raw-ZdXu8 
71
 http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/farm-commodity-policy/program-
provisions/counter-cyclical-payments.aspx#.U2rc8-ZdXu8 
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these commodity programs, the Price Loss Coverage (PLC) and Agriculture Risk 
Coverage (ARC) programs.
72
 
The first program, the PLC program, acts much in the same way as counter 
cyclical payments, in that farmers receive payments when the crop price falls below the 
set threshold.  An important note is that cotton is not a covered commodity in this 
program.  Below is the reference table for both corn and soybeans.
73
  
2014 Farm Act reference prices 
Covered commodities Reference prices 
Corn $3.70 per bushel 
Soybeans $8.40 per bushel 
 
 The second program is the Agriculture Risk Coverage (ARC) Program, which has 
both county-based and individual coverage.  This means that for either of the two, 
payments are provided to producers for their commodities when crop revenue drops 
below 86 percent of either the county benchmark revenue or the farm’s individual 
benchmark guarantee.  For each commodity the payment amount is as the USDA 
calculates first for the country choice “the difference between the per-acre guarantee (as 
calculated above) and actual per-acre revenue (but no greater than 10 percent of the 
commodity’s benchmark revenue), times 85 percent of base acres of the commodity”.  
For individual coverage, “The payment amount is the individual farm payment rate (the 
difference between the individual farm guarantee and actual individual farm revenue, but 
no greater than 10 percent of the farm’s benchmark revenue) times 65 percent of base 
                                                 
72
 http://www.ers.usda.gov/agricultural-act-of-2014-highlights-and-implications/crop-
commodity-programs.aspx#.U2rgceZdXu8 
73
 Ibid. 
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acres for all covered commodities for the individual farm.”74One interesting facet of this 
ARC program is the installation of payment limitations.  Payments are limited to 
$125,000 for each farmer, with an extension of an additional $125,000 for spouses.
75
  
 
 
  
                                                 
74
 Ibid. 
75
 Ibid. 
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
 This thesis on agricultural subsidies, their economic and political implications and 
what would happen to both price and production levels contained several key insights 
into both the political and economic spheres in this industry.  Looking first at the 
technological and scientific advancements, the economic impacts can be seen in three 
major areas: production, costs and price.  All three show positive change that has shown 
to be a big boon to the consumer, dropping prices dramatically over time.   However, on a 
related note farm labor has also dropped, which has transformed America into a 
manufacturing and service economy.  Overall the technological advancements, 
biotechnological advancements and expansion of information and marketing have led to 
the mechanization and industrialization of the farming industry, effectively increasing 
farm size, increasing output, decreasing price and decreasing labor. The externalities 
related to these effects helped shape both political and economic policy related to the 
agricultural sector. 
Moving to what has been a (Gardner, 2002)ffected, namely the economic and 
political theory and action behind agricultural policy, the historical and economic 
analysis I have undertaken has led to interesting findings.  I have focused on four major 
areas of economic theory that affect the agricultural market: vertical integration, 
economies of scale, elasticity of markets and subsidization.  These economic linchpins 
often hold true to one main school of thought, for instance that subsidization is often a 
poor economic policy to undertake because if a company cannot survive on their own 
they should be allowed to fail and be replaced.  However, in the real world it has not been 
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as simple.  Through the processes of integration and expansion of scale within the 
farming business model and combined with the elasticity and variability within the 
commodities market, government subsidization policies in the form of price controls and 
income supports has been the answer to the two main questions, How can we stabilize the 
market and make sure farmers earn enough to support themselves?   
 Politically, the legislation has evolved from the New Deal to the post WWII Farm 
Bills in the 50s, 60s and 70s to the much more market oriented policies in the FAIR Act 
and ARPA in the 90s and 2000s. These economic and political factors have all led up to 
the landscape of the agricultural sector today, one with a tight relationship between 
government and business, leading to precarious positions for those in government who do 
not wish to jeopardize their futures in the private sector. 
 So we come to where we are today and where we are going.  In the past 10 years, 
there has been some drawdown on the vast amount spent on commodities programs, with 
the most recent 2014 Agriculture Act essentially cutting and combining everything into 
two main support programs, alongside crop insurance.  While this does certainly continue 
the downward trend on expenditures, it is still in line with the economic and political 
school of thought that there should continue to be subsidization at the federal level for 
specific crops.  The real question that stems from this is what does this mean for the 
consumer, the producer, and the American economy?  The chapter on the pros and cons 
of these price and income supports does well to illuminate the effects.  The narrative 
historically has been one of an unstable agricultural market, replete with negative 
externalities as well as disadvantaged consumers and farmers alike.  These negative 
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externalities have been dealt with for the past 80 years through price and income supports 
stemming from government intervention.  
While the current program outline seems to be balancing both economic and 
political goals and at the same time reigning in the massive amount of money going out, 
there is still merit to the idea that subsidies, more specifically their end, would not 
completely dismantle the agricultural sector as some believe.  While there are 10s if not 
100s of other variables not accounted for in my model, I believe my model’s merit lies 
within its exploratory nature and forward prediction.  Looking across all three crops, 
there are several correlations between both the dependent and independent variables that 
lead to some interesting conclusions.  For both corn and cotton price and production were 
very closely related, as was NFI for all three crops.  This indicates that the agricultural 
sector as a larger entity is not as starkly diversified in its relationships as one might think, 
and even across food and non-food crops the relationship between subsidization and 
output can be seen.  While most major economic data already supports such a conclusion, 
it is important to quantify the magnitude, as well as establish a base to build a forward-
looking perspective on.  My results are predictable in that price and production move in 
the predicted direction given a stoppage in support, but are interesting in that the swings 
are not at all as dramatic as I thought they were going to be.   
 Price without 
subsidy 
Price following 
projected growth 
Production 
without subsidy 
Production following 
projected growth 
Corn $7.48 11.6 19677.42 17825.37 
Cotton 106.6 79.25 15112.1 11851.93 
Soybeans 17.23 23.96 3035.16 3497.3 
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With one of the main goals of current agricultural policy being price supports, it is 
not surprising to see the prices of both corn and soybeans go down.  However, while this 
decrease might spell the end to some farmers that lie right on the edge of profitability, it 
did not plummet to cents on the bushel.  Similarly with production, it only increased 
around 10% for corn, with cotton increasing more along 30%.  While this is nothing to 
scoff at given the amount produced, it is not too dramatic an increase to make impossible 
a return to the projected gross revenue seen today.   
Overall, the arguments presented regarding the current state of affairs do not sway 
completely in either the direction of unwavering support or complete repulsion.  To scrap 
these programs entirely and all at once would be a huge detriment to the agricultural 
sector as well as the larger economy.  However, to continue to slightly draw down these 
supports as has been done might not necessarily be a bad thing from an economic 
viewpoint, but it would come at a cost.  By adapting or slightly modifying the policies in 
place to accommodate a much smaller subsidy program, costs could easily be brought to 
much lower levels, but it would most likely come at the cost of many small farmers being 
put in a bad if not impossible situation due to the great scale advantages afforded big, 
mechanized farms.  While this could be argued to be better for the American economy 
from an efficiency perspective, if indeed the government continues to believe it has a 
duty to ensure these small farmers a living, this will make it nigh impossible to achieve 
both ends.   And with such a switch, the already rampant political influence could just get 
worse. Moving forward there can and must be a comprehensive policy platform that can 
maybe not fully achieve the both the economic and political goals, but can reach some 
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economic goals while at the same time not subjecting consumers, small farmers and 
others to the growing agribusiness sector. 
 
  
   81
Appendix 1. Evolution Graphs 
Corn 
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Cotton 
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Soybeans 
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